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Abstract
Lobbying is central to the democratic process. Yet, only four political systems have lobbying
regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (European Parliament). Despite
works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a two-fold void exists in the
literature. Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four
political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments.
Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents - politicians, lobbyists and
regulators - and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments.
We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the
systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different ‘ideal’ types of regulatory
environment.

Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and

regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what
correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The
conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy-makers in systems
without lobbying legislation.

Introduction and Objectives
Lobbying is a central and legitimate part of the democratic process in all political
systems. Although the term has often been associated with negative connotations, the work of
lobbyists is essential: the provision of input, and feedback, to the political system, thereby helping
develop policy outputs. Lobby groups may include those with economic interests (corporations),
professional interests (trade unions or representatives of a professional society) and civil society
interests (such as environmental groups). These groups may seek to influence political decisions
by many means, including direct communications with governmental officials, presentations, and
telephone conversations.
Notwithstanding the importance of lobby/interest groups, only four political systems in
the world have regulations with regard to lobbying activity: the United States, Canada, Germany
and the European Union (most particularly, the European Parliament). ‘Regulations’ refer to
‘rules’, which interest groups must follow when pursuing lobbying activity including, registering
with the state before contact can be made with any public official. It is assumed that regulation of
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interest group activities offers several advantages to the political system. Some include increased
accountability and transparency, as well as diminishing loopholes in the system which would
otherwise allow for corrupt behaviour. In this regard, schemes to regulate lobbying derive from
concerns over the democratic deficit, the openness and transparency of government, equality of
access to public affairs, and the perceived need to manage information flows to and from
governments.1
We turn first to the United States. In the 1930s Congress enacted legislation in response
to a number of scandals concerning the lobbying of public utility companies and the maritime
industry. However, these regulations were perceived as inadequate. The Lobbying Act 1946
(Federal) thus sought ‘to disclose to the legislators and the public the identity of the principals,
representatives, and the means involved, to make the free play of legislative interest transparent’2.
In other words, the registration of lobbyists ‘should at least work in the direction of greater
transparency’3. However, this Act, hurriedly drafted, contained numerous loopholes. Since
publicity was considered important in diminishing bad lobbying practices, critics claimed the
statute provided inadequate publicity for the activities of pressure groups4. As Wolpe and
Levine’s data shows, ‘a 1991 General Accounting Office report found that fewer than 4,000 of
the 13,500 individuals listed in a directory of Washington lobbyists were registered’5. It over a
half a century for the 1946 Act to be replaced by the Lobbying Disclosures Act in 1995, which
increased the reporting requirements of lobbying organizations. This law extended the definition
of lobbyists to include those that lobby directly, as well as those that hire lobbying firms6. All
states, except Pennsylvania, have individual lobbying legislation.

Pennsylvania did have

legislation, the 1998 Lobbying Disclosure Act, but this was struck down in 2000 by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court as it pertains to attorneys, with the court saying the General
Assembly of Pennsylvania’s efforts to monitor the activities of lobbyists amounted to illegal
regulations on the practice of law. This invalidated the law. In 2002 the Pennsylvanian Supreme
Court reaffirmed its decision.
In Canada, consensus developed among politicians that legislation requiring the
registration of lobbyists was necessary to promote transparency and accountability.7 The federal
level was first to pursue lobbying legislation in 1989 by way of the Lobbyist Registration Act
(Canada). The 1989 Act, was amended in 1995 with the Amendment to Lobbyist Registration
Act, which sought to beef up the information requirements to be forwarded by lobbyists when
registering. The final major amendment to the federal Act came with Bill C-15 in 2003 (enforce
in 2005) that sought to close loopholes in the previous system with regard to definitions of
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‘lobbying.’ Following from the federal lead, the provinces of Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario,
British Columbia (BC) and most recently Newfoundland enacted lobbying legislation.
Proponents of Canadian regulations identified two beneficiaries – the public, and government
officials8 – where the acts have ‘thrown light on the activities of professional lobbyists in
Canada’.9 Despite this, some critics contend that the legislation is weak compared to US laws.10

The German Bundestag is currently the only parliament in Europe that has adopted
formal rules on registration of lobbyists, and those wishing to lobby either the Bundestag, or the
Federal Government, or both, must register on this public list to promote transparency. In
principle, lobbyists cannot be heard by parliamentary committees, or be issued with a pass
admitting them to parliamentary buildings, unless they are on the register. This system was first
regulated in the Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag in 1951, through article 73 which referred to
participation by associations. It was subsequently amended on two further occasions, in 1975 and
1980, which indicated an increased use of the hearings system.11 The Bundestag can, however,
also invite organisations that are not on the register to present information on an ad hoc basis.
This in essence means that not being on the register is no real barrier to being in contact with
parliamentary committees or members of the Bundestag. The Bundestag makes quite clear that
consulting with interest groups and professional associations is crucial when drafting legislation.
Article 77, paragraph (1) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany provides for
legislative bills to be adopted by the Bundestag. The Bundestag is of the view that many people
should participate in the substantive elaboration of bills, but responsibility for enacting bills must
be assumed by those elected for this purpose, hence the nature of invitations to those not on any
register.

Even though the size of the interest group population in Brussels raises concerns over
equality of access to, and the ethical standards of, European decision-making,12 the only EU
institution which has lobbying regulations is the European Parliament. The debate on lobbying,
linked to the issue of transparency in EU institutions, began in 1992 with the report of MEP Marc
Galle, and was followed in 1996 by the report of MEP Glynn Ford. However, apart from
minimalist regulations adopted, there was insufficient support for the idea that in exchange for the
annual renewal of their entry passes, lobbyists should provide detailed reports of their efforts to
influence the Parliament's decision-making process. In some contrast to the EP, the Commission
has continued to favour self-regulation of interests, despite traditionally being the primary target
of lobbyists in Brussels.13
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Despite the many works that have offered individual country analysis of development of
lobbying legislation, there is a two-fold void in the literature. First, no study has offered a
comparative analysis that classifies the types of laws in these four political systems. This will
allow for better understanding of the different regulatory environments one finds in this issue
area. Secondly, few studies have analysed what are the views of key agents involved in the
process, including politicians, lobbyists and regulators, and how these compare and contrast
across different regulatory environments.
The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, we will use a quantitative index to measure
how strong or weak the regulations are in each system, allowing us to devise a classification
scheme of the different ‘ideal’ types of regulatory environments. We will argue that the three
ideal types are lowly, medium, and strongly regulated systems. Secondly, we will measure the
opinion of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (as measured through
questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, one can draw between the
different ideal types of systems and their opinions. We will argue that actors in highly regulated
systems claim to know more about legislation, are more likely to argue that accountability is
ensured, and feel that there are fewer loopholes in the system that those respondents from lower
regulated systems. Nevertheless, even in relatively highly regulated systems, the regulations can
be undermined under the ‘if there is a will there is always a way’ principle.

Rating Regulation – Regulatory Environment Ideal Types
There are two measures of the rigour with which the US regulates lobbying. The first is
Opheim’s rating of the stringency of lobbying regulation in 47 states.14 Opheim’s index consists
of 22 separately scored items drawn from three different dimensions of lobbying regulation
requirements. The dimensions were: (1) statutory definitions of a lobbyist (seven items); (2)
frequency and quality of disclosure (eight items); and (3) oversight and enforcement of
regulations (seven items). The values of the index range from a low of 0 for Arkansas to a high
of 18 for New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin. The second measure is Brinig et al.’s, rating
of the restrictiveness of state lobbying laws.15 Rather than offer explicit coding schemes, their
work highlights specific examples.

They consider the frequency with which lobbyists are

required to register and report, and their scheme emphasises the severity of penalties for
violations of lobbying laws. The values of the index range from a low of 1 for Arkansas to a high
of 14 for Alabama and Kentucky.
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An extension of this method of analysis has been pursued by the Centre for Public
Integrity (CPI), which has analyzed lobbying legislation in the 50 US jurisdictions with such (the
federal level and 49 states that have legislation) and measured the legislations’ effectiveness. The
detailed process of analysis is referred to as the ‘Hired Guns’ method, which results in a ‘CPI
Scores.’ The CPI writes
‘Hired Guns’ is an analysis of lobby disclosure laws in all 50 states. The
Center for Public Integrity created a ranking system that assigns a score to
each state (with lobbying legislation) based on a survey containing a series of
questions regarding state lobby disclosure. The questions addressed eight key
areas of disclosure for state lobbyists and the organizations that put them to
work:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Definition of Lobbyist
Individual Registration
Individual Spending Disclosure
Employer Spending Disclosure
Electronic Filing
Public Access (to a registry of lobbyists)
Enforcement and
Revolving Door Provisions (with a particular focus on ‘cooling off
periods’)

Example 1 (Appendix A) – which offers an example of the CPI’s examination of Washington
State– shows how the CPI extends on Opheim’s model by considering 48 questions in its 8
sections.
In fact, the CPI’s index goes well beyond the extent of Opheim’s work by looking at individual
lobbyist registration, electronic filing, public access, and revolving door provisions. On one
level, this broader examination of lobbying regulations is a natural product of time, and
technological development. Electronic filing of returns by lobbyists, and public internet access to
detailed databases of lobbyists, was far in the future in 1991. But, on another level, the CPI’s
framework is more thorough than Opheim’s, in that it examines the issues of individual lobbying
registration, public access to a directory of lobbyists, and the revolving door provisions, which
Opheim bypassed.

Thus, in expanding upon the range of lobbying regulations studied by

Opheim, and setting out 48 separately scored items, as opposed to Opheim’s 22, the CPI’s
framework constitutes a broader, and deeper, approach to analysing the rigour with which states
regulate lobbies.

7

That the CPI’s framework was designed for examining lobbying regulations in the US
should not render it inapplicable to other jurisdictions. As the framework is capable of taking
account of the widely varying standards of lobbying regulation across all 50 American states, and
at the federal level, it should also be capable of taking account of lobbying regulations in other
countries. The very thoroughness of the framework makes it analytically encompassing.
Based on analysis of the legislation, each question is assigned a numerical (i.e. point)
value according to the answer given. The more points that are given, the ‘better’ the legislation in
terms of promoting concepts such as full disclosure, public access, and transparency.

The

maximum score a jurisdiction could attain is 100 points, the minimum 1 point (a score of zero
would be given to a state with no lobbying legislation). According to the CPI, if a jurisdiction
attains a score of 60 points, or more, it is deemed to ‘pass’, based on the grading system used in
American schools. Regardless of the somewhat arbitrary rule of what constitutes a ‘passing
grade’, as a general rule one can argue that the lower the CPI score, the less robust the lobbying
regulations in place.
To gain comparative insights, we transfer the CPI method to analysing lobbying
legislation in Canada, Germany and the European Parliament. As an objective here is to offer a
comparative analysis of the lobbying legislation in place in four political systems, it was felt that,
given its robustness and detailed method of analysis, application of the CPI methodology would
allow for greater insights with regard to how the different countries studied compared and
contrasted to each other, and how this could be theoretically classified. For illustrative purposes,
Example 1 (Appendix A) also shows how the CPI scores for Canadian federal lobbying
legislation, and German lobbying legislation, were calculated by this research team. As in the
previous example of Washington State, point values are assigned to each of the 48 questions.
With the above in mind, we applied the CPI method of analysis to all other jurisdictions
where lobbying legislation exists, including the state and provincial levels in the US and Canada
respectively. Because all Länder level legislation is similar to the German federal legislation,
only the German Federal level is reported. Table 1 summarises our findings, illustrating the CPI
scores for each of the jurisdictions in descending order. The scores for the US are taken from the
CPI website, whereas all other scores were calculated by the research team.

(Table 1 about here)
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Based on analysis of the table, at least three observations can be made. First 50 per cent of the
US observations have scores of 60 points or more, where the American federal legislation has a
score below most states. Second, all Canadian observations have scores that hover between 35
and 50 points. Finally, the lowest jurisdictions are Germany and the European Parliament.

With Table 1 in mind, and given that it is useful to gain a theoretical understanding of the
different sorts of regulatory systems, one can consider developing a theoretical classification of
the different types of lobbying regulatory environments. Clearly, any classification scheme will
be debated and challenged. But, using classification schemes, and developing what Max Weber
referred to as ‘ideal types’, where the ideal type is formed from characteristics and elements of
the given phenomenon but is not meant to correspond to all of the characteristics of any one
particular case, forms the basis for helping us understand common trends as well as differences.
We argue that there are three ‘ideal types’ of regulatory systems relative to each other: lowly
regulated systems, medium regulated systems, and highly regulated systems.

The first, relatively lowly regulated systems correspond to jurisdictions that attained CPI
scores between 1 and 19, and refers to Germany and the European Parliament. Such systems
entail the following qualitative characteristics. They have rules on individual registration, where
lobbyist must register, but few details have to be given (such as in the case of the EP where
lobbyists do not have to state which subject matter/bill/institution they are lobbying). There are
no rules on individual spending disclosure (lobbyists are not required to file spending reports) or
an employer spending disclosure (lobbyists’ employers are not required to file spending reports).
There is a weak system of on-line registration. Lobbyists’ lists are available to the public, but not
all details are displayed. Finally, there are little enforcement capabilities, and no cooling-off
period in the legislation, which means legislators can register as lobbyists immediately after
leaving office.
The second type, medium regulated systems correspond to those jurisdictions that
attained a CPI score between 20 and 59, and include all the Canadian jurisdictions plus several
American ones, including the federal level. In these systems the rules on individual registration
are tighter than in ‘Lowly Regulated Systems’. For instance, those registering must state the
subject matter/bill/governmental institution being lobbied.

Regulations exist surrounding

individual spending disclosures, whereby gifts are prohibited, and all political contributions must
be reported. Yet, there are loopholes, such as free ‘consultancy’ by lobbyists to political parties.
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There are no regulations for employer spending reports, so a lobbyist’s employer is not required
to file a spending report. There is a system of on-line registration, which in some cases, such as
Ontario, is efficient and effective, requiring few resources to use and maintain. Public access to a
lobbying register is available and updated at frequent intervals, although spending disclosures are
not publicised. In theory, a state agency can conduct mandatory reviews and audits, although it is
unlikely the agency will prosecute violations of regulations given its lack of resources and
information. There is only one case of a prosecution in the whole of Canada, that was in Quebec
in 2006. Finally, there is a cooling off period before legislators, having left office, can register as
lobbyists.
The final type, relatively highly regulated systems entail jurisdictions, which attained a CPI score
of over 60 and under 100. This corresponds exclusively to 50 per cent of the American States,
with the highest being Washington State. The rules on individual registration in these systems are
the tightest of the three. For example, not only is the subject matter/institution required when
registering, but also the lobbyist must state the name of all employers, notify almost immediately
any changes in the registration, and provide a photograph. Tight individual spending disclosures
are required, in stark contrast to both lowly and medium regulated systems. In this context a
lobbyist must file a spending report, his/her salary must be reported, all spending must be
accounted for and itemised, all people on whom money was spent must be identified, and all
campaign spending must be accounted for. Employer spending disclosure is also tight. Unlike
‘lowly regulated’ or ‘medium regulated’ systems, an employer of a lobbyist is required to file a
spending report and all salaries must be reported. A system for on-line registration exists, and
public access to a lobbying registry is available, which is updated frequently. This includes
spending disclosures, which are available to the public, a provision not found in the other two
systems. State agencies conduct mandatory reviews and audits, and there is a statutory penalty
for late and incomplete filing of a lobbying registration form. Finally, there is a cooling off
period before legislators, having left office, can register as lobbyists.

(Table 2 about here)

Actors’ Opinions; and Correlations with Ideal Types

To understand how effective the legislation has been questionnaires were sent to lobby
groups, politicians, and public sector administrators in the federal and provincial jurisdictions
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with lobbying legislation in Canada, including Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, and British
Columbia; the federal level and a representative sample of states in the US, including
Washington, New York, California, Texas, Georgia, Colorado, Florida, Illinois; and actors
working at both the federal German level and the EP. As Newfoundland only implemented
legislation in late 2005, no surveys were sent there. The total number of questionnaires sent
between October and December 2005 was 1808, of which 1225 were dispatched to lobbyists, 91
to public sector administrators, and 492 to politicians. Given that questionnaires sent by email
generally yield a low response rate, hardcopies sent by post was the approach adopted here.
Taking all four political systems, a total of 140 questionnaires were completed: 6.5 per cent of all
lobbyists, 19.8 per cent of all public sector administrators, and 8.7 per cent of all politicians
responded. Several respondents replied that although interested in the study, they were unable to,
or did not want to, fill in the questionnaire. This can partly explain why response rates were not
higher, especially for politicians. It reflects the fact that some felt the subject matter sensitive and
did not want to state their positions (despite the guarantee of anonymity).

Another factor

impinging upon our response rate was that several respondents had moved, changed address,
changed portfolios or, in the case of politicians, retired. When completing the questionnaire,
respondents were also asked if they would be willing to partake in a follow up interview. As
such, we held over 25 on-site interviews in Canada and the US, and several telephone interviews
with officials in Brussels and Germany, between March and April 2006. Taking both the
questionnaires and elite interviews, we consider the respondents’ answers to the various
questions, while attempting to see if there are correlations between the overall responses to
questions and the ideal type of system respondents come from. We recognise that, when

compared to large N studies, the numbers of respondents is relatively small, but, it was
our intention to gain an indication of trends and relations, not to conduct a ‘large N’ study
per se.
One of the first questions asked if respondents considered themselves knowledgeable on
the relevant legislation pertaining to regulation of lobbyists. Approximately 85 per cent of
elected representatives and public sector administrators considered themselves knowledgeable.
77 per cent of lobbyists saw themselves as knowledgeable, with the only outlier being Germany
where almost half were neutral on the issue, and slightly more than 50 per cent did not consider
themselves knowledgeable.

To ascertain if there are correlations between answers to this

question and our classification of ‘ideal types’ of systems discussed above (lowly, medium and
highly regulated) we first compressed all the responses from the question into the three
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categories, defined by CPI ranges of 0-19, 20-59, and 60-100. Then we carried out crosstabulations: Pearson chi-square tests the hypothesis that the CPI ranges and the answers to the
questions are independent. The lower the significance value for a correlation the less likely it is
that the two variables are independent. In other words, the lower the score the more likely they
are related. With this test a value of less than 0.05 is considered significant. When the crosstabulations were completed, a correlation was found: actors in higher regulated systems are more
likely to strongly agree with the idea that they are more knowledgeable about the legislation.
This makes intuitive sense because if an actor is in an environment where there are more robust
‘rules,’ the more likely they will feel responsible to learn what these are. The opposite is also true
as reflected in the responses from lobbyists in Germany: the less robust the regulations, then the
less likely respondents would feel responsibility to learn about the rules as their impact is
minimal in any case.
Another question we sought to measure was whether respondents felt the overall regulations
in their jurisdiction help ensure accountability in government. Over 76 per cent of elected
representative felt lobbying legislation helped ensure accountability, while this figure dropped to
71 per cent for lobbyists. Nevertheless, only 50 per cent of public sector administrators felt
lobbying regulations ensured accountability. Regulators at the Canadian federal level represented
an outlier, with none considering lobbying regulations as helping ensure accountability. When
performing the cross-tabulations a correlation was found: actors in higher regulated systems were
more likely to argue that the system ensures accountability. Again, this does make intuitive sense
given that tighter regulatory systems promote accountability precisely because the rules are
stronger. On the other hand, the weaker the regulations the more likely they will have less effect
in promoting accountability.
Another question sought to measure whether respondents felt having public access to an
official list of lobbyists ensures accountability. The following answers were given across all four
countries: almost 70 per cent of elected representatives, and 80 per cent of administrators,
considered public access to an official list of lobbyists ensured accountability. However, only 60
per cent of lobbyists regarded public access to an official list of lobbyists as ensuring
accountability. There was a correlation here: respondents in higher regulated systems were more
likely to strongly agree that having an official list of lobbyists ensures accountability than those in
lower regulated systems. When cross tabulations were run on whether there was a correlation
between CPI scores and if public access to an official list of lobbyists was freely available, a
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correlation was found: higher regulated systems guarantee public access and knowledge of who is
lobbying the government. This indicates that higher regulated systems foster transparency.
Taking both observations together, one interpretation is that higher regulated systems are more
likely to have safeguards that ensure a list of lobbyists is in place at all times, and is readily
accessible to the public via the internet.

When asked if reviews or audits of lobbyists by agencies are effective in ensuring
accountability, almost 38 per cent of elected representative were neutral on this question, while
only 43 per cent regarded reviews or audits of lobbyists as effective in ensuring accountability.
Over 58 per cent of public sector administrators were neutral. Only about 40 per cent of lobby
groups agreed that reviews or audits of lobbyists by agencies are effective in ensuring
accountability. Lobbyists were more inclined than the other two groups towards neutrality or
disagree. Unlike the previous questions on accountability, there was no correlation: suggesting
no relationship between the type of regulations in place and whether or not reviews or audits
ensure accountability.
Beyond the above finding showing that higher regulatory systems promote transparency
in the political process through ensuring public lists of lobbying groups are freely available,
another question sought to measure whether specific rules surrounding individual spending
disclosures help ensure transparency. Over 93 per cent of elected representative agreed, or
strongly agreed, that specific rules surrounding individual spending disclosures help ensure
transparency, while this number dropped to 65 per cent and 75 percent for administrators and
lobbyists respectively. No correlation was found between CPI scores and transparency with
regard to individual disclosures: mostly all respondents believed that individual spending
disclosures promoted transparency. However, of all systems, only highly regulated ones have the
strongest rules surrounding individual and employer spending disclosers, such as whether a
lobbyist is required to file a spending report, if salaries are to be reported by lobbyists on
spending reports, and whether the recipient of the expenditure is required to be identified. While
this finding suggests respondents from highly regulated systems are satisfied with regulations
surrounding individual spending disclosures, the survey finding suggest one of two things for
those respondents from lowly, and medium, regulated systems.

Either they would not

unreasonably want to see more rules surrounding individual spending disclosures forming part of
their legislation, or they like the idea ‘in theory,’ but do not want to see it form a full part of their
legislation.
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An interesting finding relates to loopholes. We initially asked respondents whether they
thought there are loopholes in the system that would allow individual lobbyists to give/receive
‘gifts’, regardless of the legislation in force. In Germany and the EP, 35 per cent of elected
representatives agreed there are loopholes in the system permitting lobbyists to give/receive
‘gifts.’ However, in American jurisdictions such as New York and California, the opposite is the
case. Public sector administrators tended to be more neutral or disagreed with this question (78
per cent). Only at the federal level in Canada do administrators believe there are loopholes. In
jurisdictions such as Germany, 58 per cent of lobbyists held there are loopholes, while the
remainder were neutral. In New York and California, lobbyists are much less likely to agree with
the view there are loopholes. A correlation found that the more lowly regulated the system, the
more likely it was perceived to have loopholes. This again makes some intuitive sense: if there
are tighter rules, it is less likely that you will find a ‘loophole’. However, it is important to note
that several of the interviewees mentioned the idea that, ‘regardless of the legislation in force,
there are always ways of getting around it,’ even in highly regulated systems; or, as a Canadian
interviewee put it ‘where there’s a will, there’s a way!’ Even in Washington State, the highest
regulated jurisdiction in the study, a CPI report in August 2005 found that the spirit of the state’s
exemplary disclosure law was being undermined by lobbyists who report their clients’ purposes
on disclosure forms in vague terms. This view was reiterated by both lobbyists and regulators in
interviews in Olympia, Washington State, in March 2006.

A senior official of the Public

Disclosure Commission (PDC), in Washington State remarked that while the vast majority of
lobbyists, and those they lobby on behalf of, were happy to obey the rules, there were always a
few who would try to flout them. If we take the case of Canada, legislation exists specifying that
only $1,000 can be given to any political party during a campaign. Ways of ‘getting around this’
include: free consultancy work by lobbyists for a political party during an election with the view
of attaining pay-offs if the party gets elected; or helping ‘fund-raise’ for a party by holding
special private events (such as a fund-raising supper).
The problems of loopholes relates to the other problem of enforcement. Although there
is little enforcement capabilities in lowly regulated systems, most legislation in highly and
medium regulated systems encompasses a system of fines if, for example, a lobbyist has not
registered. But, how effective are registrars in enforcing that lobbyists register in medium and
highly regulated systems? When asked if they thought there are lobby groups working that have
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not registered Canadian regulators answer ‘probably.’

But, the following response by an

interviewee in Canada illustrates the effectiveness of enforcement:

Some lobby groups are not registered because they are ignorant of the rules.
Others, such as some lawyers, don’t realise that they are lobbyists. If I receive
a complaint from a third party, I investigate it… but I have usually found that
‘human error’ is the reason for not having registering…. (there is no
maliciousness). Registering helps increase the credibility and trust that
citizens have in lobby groups and politicians alike.
A similar point was made in Washington State, where the PDC observed that much of the
problem in relation to non registration was human error and not malicious. Those that were
malicious were quickly discovered and punished, as the registration system has gained
widespread credibility, and those who hire lobbyists demand they are registered. Interestingly,
many lobby groups register not only because it is required in certain jurisdictions, but also
because it is good ‘public relations’, and in their ‘self-interest’. As several lobbyists in medium
and highly regulated systems mentioned, with the registration system they could illustrate to their
members what their lobbying activities were at the local government level. Some lobbyists said
they registered to show other lobbyists and consultants what ‘they were doing,’ or ‘showing how
successful they are in terms of the work that is being done.’ From this perspective, enforcement
is not a problem as lobby groups strategically use the registry to legitimate what they are doing,
and to get the ‘message across’ to citizens and competitors alike.

Conclusions
Despite the existing literature on lobbying, no study has offered a comparative analysis of
developments in the four systems where lobbying legislations exists. Nor has there been a
comparative study seeking to better understand politicians’, lobbyists’ and regulators’ views of
the regulations, and how these vary according to the specific regulatory environment. With this
in mind, the paper’s first objective was employ a quantitative index to measure the strength of
regulations in each of the four systems, which would allow for a classification scheme of the
‘ideal’ types of regulatory environments. The second objective was to gauge the opinion of
political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems, and measure what correlations,
if any, can be drawn between the different ideal types of systems and their opinions.
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The first significant finding is that three ideal types of regulatory environment can be
conceptualised with respect to lobbying regulations, and that there is not simply one model per
se. The first are lowly regulated systems, and the main conclusion drawn from them are that rules
on individual lobbyists registration exist, but few details beyond this are required. Moreover,
while lobbying lists are available for public scrutiny, details such as spending reports are not.
The political systems that fit within this ideal type are Germany and the European Union. By
contrast, the main findings from medium regulated systems are that lobbyists must not only
register, but must also state the institutional actors they are lobbying, and the subject matter they
are lobbying on. Some regulations exist surrounding individual spending disclosures, gifts are
prohibited, and all political contributions must be reported. But, there are no regulations for
employers’ spending reports, and lobbyist spending disclosures are not available for public
scrutiny. The systems within this ideal type include the federal levels in Canada and the United
States, all Canadian provinces, and several US states. In strongly regulated systems lobbyists
must reveal their employers, the institutional actors they are lobbying, and the subject matter they
are lobbying upon. Rigorous individual spending disclosures are required of both lobbyists, and
their employers.

Scrutiny of spending disclosures is open to the public, and regulatory

transgressions are punishable by means of significant penalties. Fitting within this ideal type are
half the American states.
The second significant finding relates to the opinions of agents involved in lobbying,
including politicians, regulators and interest groups. Actors in highly regulated systems were
more likely to agree, compared to actors in lowly regulated systems, that regulations help ensure
accountability in government. In other words, the stronger the rules the more accountability is
fostered in the political system. It was also found that actors in higher regulated systems are more
likely to strongly agree that they are knowledgeable about legislation. In this scenario, the tighter
the rules, the greater the responsibility actors feel to study them. Another finding was that the
weaker the regulatory environment, the more lightly respondents were to think there were
loopholes. Nevertheless, it was argued that even in relatively highly regulated systems, if there is
a ‘will’ there is always a ‘way’ of undermining the regulations. From this perspective, while
highly regulated systems help ensure fewer loopholes, no ideal type is infallible.
While this study has been concerned with understanding lobbying regulations in four
systems, the findings may offer two primary insights for states such as the UK and Ireland that
have considered regulating lobbying activity, but have yet to adopt such rules. The first is that
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there are different ways to regulate lobbyists. For example, the lowly regulated ideal system
suggests that there is ‘light’ way of regulating, while the highly regulated system suggests there is
‘heavy’ way of so doing. Depending on what the objectives of the regulation are, states may
implement different ideal types. The second insight is that adoption of different ideal types will
have different impacts. For example, if a highly regulated ideal type is implemented, this seems
to foster accountability in the political system as well as promote safeguards against different
loopholes. Nevertheless, with regard to the latter point, this study has shown that lobbying
legislation is no panacea: if lobbyists and politicians desire to pursue corrupt activities, no piece
of legislation will prevent them from so doing. Yet, it may be argued that pursuit of lobbying
rules may serve as framework to establish a paradigm within which all policy-makers can
effectively function. This paradigm ultimately promotes the long term goals of accountability
and transparency while it potentially serves as a deterrent, if not an antidote, for corrupt practices.
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Appendix A
Example 1: CPI Score for Washington State (calculated by the Centre for Public
Integrity); Canada Federal; and Germany.
Question

Washington
Point
State Answers Value

Canada
Federal
Answers

Point
Value

Germany
Answers

Point
Value

Definition of Lobbyist
1

Yes
In addition to legislative lobbyists,
does the definiton recognize executive
branch lobbyists?

3

Yes

3

No

0

2

How much does an individual have to
make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist or
to prompt registration as a lobbyist,
according to the definition?

Must register
irrespective of
how much
made/spent

4

Must register
irrespective of
much money
made/spent

4

Must register
irrespective
how much
money
made/spent

4

Yes

3

Yes

3

Yes

3

Individual Registration
3

Is a lobbyist required to file a
registration form?

4

How many days can lobbying take
0 days
place before registration is required?

4

1 to 10 days

2

16 or more
days

0

5

Is subject matter or bill number to be Subject matter
addressed by a lobbyist required on only required
registration forms?

1

Bill number
subject matter

3

Subject Matter

1

6

How often is registration by a
lobbyist required?

Every other
year

1

Every six
months

2

Every year

2

6 to 10 days

2

16 or more
days

0

16 or more
days

0

Yes

1

No

0

No

0

Yes

1

Yes

1

Yes

1

Yes

1

Yes

1

Yes

1

Yes

3

No

0

No

0

10 or more
filings within
two years
Yes

3

No

0

N/A

0

2

No

0

No

0

14 Are summaries (totals) of spending
Yes
classified by category types (ie, gifts,
entertainment, postage, etc.)?
15 What spending must be itemized?
All spending
required to be
itemized
16 Is the lobbyist employer/principal on Yes

2

No

0

No

0

4

No

0

N/A

0

1

No

0

N/A

0

7

Within how many days must a
lobbyist notify the oversight agency of
changes in registration?
8 Is a lobbyist required to submit a
photograph with registration?
9 Is a lobbyist required to identify by
name each of employer on the
registration form?
10 Is a lobbyist required to clearly
identify on the registration form any
additional information about the type
of their lobbying work (ie,
compensated or noncompensated/contract or salaried)?
Individual Spending Disclosure
11 Is a lobbyist required to file a
spending report?
12 How often during each two-year cycle
is a lobbyist required to report
spending?
13 Is compensation/salary required to be
reported by a lobbyist on spending
reports?

18
whose behalf the itemized expenditure
was made required to be identified?
17 Is the recipient of the itemized
Yes
expenditure required to be identified?
18 Is the date of the itemized expenditure Yes
required to be reported?

1

No

0

No

0

1

No

0

No

0

19 Is a description of the itemized
Yes
expenditure required to be reported?

1

No

0

No

0

20 Is subject matter or bill number to be
addressed by a lobbyist required on
spending reports?
21 Is spending on household members of
public officials by a lobbyist required
to be reported?
22 Is a lobbyist required to disclose
direct business associations with
public officials, candidates or
members of their households?
23 What is the statutory provision for a
lobbyist giving/reporting gifts?

Subject matter
only required

1

Bill number
required

3

No

0

Yes

1

No

0

No

0

No

0

No

0

No

0

Gifts are
limited and
reported

2

Gifts
prohibited

3

None

0

24 What is the statutory provision for a
lobbyist giving/reporting campaign
contributions?

Contribute
allowed;
disclosed on
spending
report/
prohibited
during session

1

all political
contribution
reported by
recipient

1

None

0

25 Is a lobbyist who has done no
spending during a filing period
required to make a report of no
activity?

Yes

1

No

0

No

0

26 Is an employer/principal of a lobbyist Yes
required to file a spending report?
27 Is compensation/salary required to be Yes
reported on employer/principal
spending reports?

3

No

0

No

0

2

No

0

No

0

1

Yes

1

No

0

1

Yes

1

No

0

1

Yes

1

No

0

Employer Spending Disclosure

Electronic Filing
Yes
28 Does the oversight agency provide
lobbyists/employers with
electronic/online registration?
29 Does the oversight agency provide
Yes
lobbyists/employers with
electronic/online spending reporting?
30 Does the oversight agency provide
Yes
training about how to file
registrations/spending reports
electronically?
Public Access
31 Location/format of registration or
active lobbyist directory:

Searchable
database on
the Web

3

Searchable
database on
the Web

4

Yes

3

32 Location/format of spending reports:

Searchable
database on
the Web

3

No

0

No

0

33 Cost of copies:

Less than 25
cents per page

1

$1 per page

0

0

1
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34 Are sample registration
forms/spending reports available the
Web?

Yes

1

No

0

No

0

35 Does the state agency provide an
overall lobbying spending total by
year?

Yes

2

No

0

No

0

36 Does the state agency provide an
overall lobbying spending total by
spending report deadlines?
37 Does the state agency provide an
overall lobbying spending total by
industries lobbyists represent?

Yes

2

No

0

No

0

Yes

2

No

0

No

0

38 How often are lobby lists updated?

Daily

4

Daily

4

Annually

1

39 Does the state have statutory auditing Yes
authority?

2

Yes

2

No

0

40 Does the state agency conduct
mandatory reviews or audits?

Yes

2

Yes

2

No

0

41 Is there a statutory penalty for late
filing of lobby registration form?

Yes

1

Yes

1

No

0

42 Is there a statutory penalty for late
filing of lobby spending report?

Yes

1

No

0

No

0

43 When was a penalty for late filing of
a lobby spending report last levied?

Within 0 to 1
year

3

N/A

0

N/A

0

44 Is there a statutory penalty for
incomplete filing of a lobby
registration form?

Yes

1

Yes

1

N/A

0

45 Is there a statutory penalty for
incomplete filing of a lobby spending
report?
46 When was a penalty for incomplete
filing of a lobby spending report last
levied?

Yes

1

N/A

0

No

0

Within 0 to 1
year/don't
accept
incomplete
filings
No

3

N/A

0

N/A

0

0

No

0

No

0

Yes

2

Yes

2

N/A

0

Enforcement

47 Does the state publish a list of
delinquent filers either on the Web or
in a printed document?
Revolving Door Provision
48 Is there a “cooling off” period
required before legislators can
register as lobbyists?
Total Number of Points

87

45
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Sources: http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/nationwide.aspx?st=WA&Display=DrStateNumbers;
authors’ analysis of Canadian Federal and German legislation.
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Table 1: CPI Scores for USA, Canada, Germany and the EP
STATE
CPI SCORE
STATE
Washington
87
Montana
Kentucky
79
Delaware
Connecticut
75
Arkansas
South Carolina
75
Louisiana
New York
74
Florida
Massachusetts
73
Oregon
Wisconsin
73
Vermont
California
71
Hawaii
Utah
70
Idaho
Maryland
68
Nevada
Ohio
67
Alabama
Indiana
66
West Virginia
Texas
66
Newfoundland
New Jersey
65
Iowa
Mississippi
65
Oklahoma
Alaska
64
North Dakota
Virginia
64
Canada Federal
Kansas
63
Illinois
Georgia
63
Tennessee
Minnesota
62
South Dakota
Missouri
61
British Columbia
Michigan
61
Ontario
Nebraska
61
Quebec
Arizona
61
New Hampshire
Colorado
60
America Federal
Maine
59
Nova Scotia
North Carolina
58
Wyoming
New Mexico
58
Germany
Rhode Island
58
EU Parliament

CPI SCORE
56
56
56
55
55
55
54
54
53
53
52
52
48
47
47
46
45
45
45
42
44
43
40
36
36
36
34
17
15

Key
America (Those in red represent jurisdictions where surveys were sent as discussed
later; other states whose CPI scores are only reported are in black)
Canada
European Parliament
Germany
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Table 2: The Three Ideal Types of Regulatory Systems
Lowly Regulated
Medium Regulated
Systems
Systems
Rules on individual
Rules on individual
Registration
registration, more details
registration, but few
regulations
required
details required
Some regulations on
No rules on individual
Spending
individual spending
spending disclosure, or
disclosure
disclosure; none on
employer spending
employer spending
disclosure
disclosure
Weak on-line registration Robust system for onElectronic
and paperwork required
line registration, no
filing
paperwork necessary
List of lobbyists
List of lobbyists
Public access
available, detailed, and
available, but not
updated frequently
detailed, or updated
frequently
In theory state agency
Little enforcement
Enforcement
possesses enforcement
capabilities invested in
capabilities, though
state agency
infrequently used
There is a cooling off
No cooling off period
Revolving
period before former
before former legislators
door
legislators can register as
can register as lobbyists
provision
lobbyists

Highly Regulated
Systems
Rules on individual
registration are extremely
rigorous
Tight regulations on
individual spending
disclosure, and employer
spending disclosure
Robust system for online registration, no
paperwork necessary
List of lobbyists and their
spending disclosures
available, detailed, and
updated frequently
State agency can, and
does, conduct mandatory
reviews /audits
There is a cooling off
period before former
legislators can register as
lobbyists
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